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WHY NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IS A UTOPIA  
 
Introduction  
Centuries ago, ancient literature told the legend of the ring of Gyges, a ring capable of 
making its owner invisible to act with no consequences and be able to seduce both just and 
unjust men to commit injustice.1  It was so powerful that it transformed a mere shepherd into a 
mighty king.  In the same way, governments around the world have been seduced to develop 
their own nuclear-weapon ring of Gyges to obtain maximum power and guarantee survival.   
Because the international community has tried to prevent wars to no avail, it is imperative 
for states to develop mechanisms to protect themselves.  In that regard, nuclear weapons are the 
best guarantee of survival.  During World War II, the international community saw how the 
United States used nuclear weapons to defeat Japan.  After that event, the number of states with 
nuclear weapons has gradually escalated.  As a result, the world has tried to prevent the use of 
nuclear weapons through extensive legal frameworks, sanctions, and counter operations.  It is 
almost impossible to stop revisionist states from acquiring their own nuclear weapons to defend 
themselves.  Likewise, nuclear-armed states will continue enhancing their triad, dyad or monad 
nuclear platforms.2  Consequently, there is no permanent peace and no single state can blindly 
trust in the intentions of other states.   
 
The right of self-defense within an anarchical international system 
There will not be enduring peace because the international system is mainly anarchical.  
As a result, states need to defend themselves.  Many realist theorists emphasize that the 
international system is anarchical because there is no central government to rule all the nations of 
the world.3  From that perspective, anarchical does not mean chaos.  It means that there is not an 
absolute ruler among states to judge and determine what it is just or unjust.  In other words, there 
is not an emergency telephone number to use if other states attack.  Even if there were a central 
government, many states would not tolerate that kind of rule.  Consequently, wars will be always 
inevitable.  
To some degree, international organizations can prevent states from abusing the present 
international system; nonetheless, international organizations cannot prevent wars among states 
because international organizations are far from perfect.  Moreover, international organizations 
can have their own particular perspectives, which can be different from what states consider to 
be right.  For instance, during the Korean War, China rejected a 1951 United Nations cease-fire 
resolution because Mao wanted to cross the thirty-eighth parallel first before negotiating for a 
cease-fire.4  Similarly, while China, France, and Russia considered that the Security Council 
Resolution 1441 (2002) did not authorize military actions against Iraq in 2003, the United States 
and Britain considered that military actions were necessary to enforce compliance with the 
Security Council Resolutions 678 (1990), 687 (1991), and 1441 (2002), which prohibited 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and demanded the restoration of peace in that state.5 
 On the other hand, even if the international organizations agreed on attacking or 
defending a particular state, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter allows the individual or 
collective right of self-defense among states in case of armed attacks.6  As a result, states do not 
necessary need the permission of an international organization to defend themselves.  As a result, 
it is possible that states will perform military operations to neutralize enemy nuclear projects.  
For example, in 1980 Iran conducted Operation Scorched Sword to destroy the Osirak nuclear 
reactor in Iraq.7  Likewise, in 1981 Israel conducted a preemptive strike against the same site to 
 
disrupt Iraqi plans to acquire nuclear weapons under the guise of nuclear energy research for 
peaceful purposes.8  Later, in 2007, Israel conducted another attack against a Syrian nuclear 
reactor.9   
Although there is disagreement about what an armed attack is, states can defend 
themselves before being attacked when it comes to nuclear weapons.  However, concepts such as 
grey zone operations and hybrid warfare are continually changing what the international 
community perceives as armed attacks.10  For instance, Russia and China use economic and 
political warfare, information campaigns, and a combination of conventional and unconventional 
military tactics, which make military operations ineffective.11   
 
The power of technology 
 Technology has the power of enabling preeminence against potential nuclear-armed 
states.  Primarily, cyberwarfare can provide the needed platform to avoid detection and enhance 
plausible deniability to disrupt enemies’ nuclear-weapon programs.  For instance, although no 
state has officially recognized the 2010 Stuxnet as its own creation, many scholars around the 
world still study how this computer malware ruined the Iranian program to develop enriched 
uranium.12  Later in 2015, North Korean hackers accessed data in a nuclear facility in South 
Korea.13  Similarly, in 2018 the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation alerted of Russian cyber-attacks against nuclear facilities in the United States.14  
Although there is not real evidence of those cyber activities, high-tech countries will use 
cyberwarfare to perform sophisticated defensive and offensive cyber operations in years to come. 
 Secondly, ever-increasing developments in hypersonic weapons can help states enhance 
their nuclear-weapon platforms, which can potentially neutralize the effectiveness of nuclear 
deterrence theory.  As of 2021, nuclear-weapon states such as the United States, China, and 
Russia have been developing hypersonic weapons.  It could be argued that nuclear-armed 
hypersonic weapons cannot really affect nuclear deterrence theory; however, hypersonic 
technology can indeed revolutionize modern warfare.15  For instance, hypersonic weapons, 
which can surpass speeds of Mach 5, are sought-after technologies because they can neutralize 
Anti-Access/Area Denial platforms, reduce enemy reaction time, and avoid tracking.16   
Thirdly, while there is no standard definition of tactical nuclear weapons, they can be 
defined as small nuclear weapons for limited strike based on their low yield and short range.17 
Nuclear-armed states have many variations of tactical nuclear weapons.  It is worth noting, states 
like China, France, Israel, India, and North Korea allegedly possess nuclear weapons which can 
be considered tactical, based on American and Russian military concepts.18  Tactical nuclear 
weapons are important for nuclear-armed states because they provide a new set of considerations 
regarding modern warfare.  For instance, according to the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, Russia 
developed a tactic known as “escalate to de-escalate.”  In theory, Russia could first escalate a 
military conflict with the use of tactical nuclear weapons against a NATO ally; and later, de-
escalate the attack to obtain favorable conditions for Russia.19  In other words, the fear of more 
powerful nuclear attacks will set the conditions for the surrender of Europe to Russian 
objectives.   
Nevertheless, if Russia employed tactical nuclear weapons in the battlefield against a 
NATO ally, would the United States counterattack with a massive nuclear strike on Russian soil 
or conduct a limited strike on disputed territories or send military ground forces that could be 
annihilated with Russian nuclear weapons?20  As a result, tactical nuclear weapons are a potential 
game changer.  It is not surprising that nuclear-armed states possess different platforms for 
 
tactical nuclear weapons.  For instance, military platforms such as the McDonnell Douglas F-
15E Strike Eagle, the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon A/B/C/D, and the Panavia 
Tornado IDS are capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons like the B61-3 that has a yield 
ranging from 0,3 to 170 kilotons.21  Similarly, the U.S. Air Force is working on the Long Range 
Standoff Weapon program to upgrade its air-launched cruise missile used by the Boeing B-52 
Stratofortress.22  Likewise Russia, which already has different variations of tactical nuclear 
weapons such as guided bombs, air-to-surface missiles, and air-to-air missiles is also improving 
the Sukhoi Su-57 as a future platform for tactical nuclear weapons.23 
Moreover, developments in ballistic and cruise missile submarines provide more 
advantages for modern warfare.  In that regard, many theorists believe that submarines with 
nuclear weapons are the best platform to guarantee stealth and survival in potential nuclear 
wars.24  In consequence, the United States has deployed nuclear submarines with tactical nuclear 
weapons to deter Russian nuclear weapon operations.25  Not surprisingly, Russia is developing 
the Status-6 Oceanic Multipurpose System or Poseidon, which is a drone submarine armed with 
tactical nuclear weapons that not only can destroy naval bases, ports, and coastal cities, but also 
cause radioactive contamination.26  It could be argued that there has been a substantial reduction 
of tactical nuclear arms; however, nuclear-armed states will continually enhance this kind of 
nuclear weapon.27 
Fourthly, there is a significant relationship among nuclear weapons, missile delivery 
systems and satellite networks that makes nuclear-armed states very formidable adversaries.  As 
of 2021, the United States, Russia, and China are the only nuclear-weapon states that have 
developed Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASAT), which have the potential to disrupt and delay early 
warning satellite systems, counter future nuclear weapon platforms in space, and degrade anti-
ballistic missile infrastructures.28  While this may be true for now, in decades to come, more 
nuclear-armed states will try to develop similar capabilities to enhance their nuclear weapon 
platforms.  For instance, not only is India working on the Global Satellite (GSAT) to enhance its 
military communication, but also its Radar Imaging Satellite (RISAT), CARTOSAT, 
Hyperspectral Imaging Satellite (HySIS), and RESOURCESAT to improve its ISR capabilities 
in order to deter China as a hostile nuclear-armed state.29  Because of these benefits, nuclear-
armed states need to improve satellite technology if they want to succeed against another 
nuclear-armed states. 
 Fifthly, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) has also revolutionized modern nuclear warfare 
because of the effects related to High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP).  High-Altitude 
Electromagnetic Pulse can be caused when a nuclear weapon is detonated at high altitude, which 
generates nuclear energy consisting of gamma rays and Compton electrons.30  In 1962, the 
United States conducted the experiment known as Starfish Prime, which was a nuclear explosion 
in space.  This experiment contributed a greater understanding of the effects of electromagnetic 
pulses, because Starfish Prime caused disruption of satellites, radar, navigation systems, and 
electronic components.31  Therefore, nuclear weapons can cause a new variety of indirect and 
direct effects on enemy defensive platforms.  According to the Electromagnetic Pulse 
Commission, nuclear-armed states such as North Korea, the United Kingdom, France, India, 
Israel, and Pakistan will work on EMP.32  As a consequence, nuclear weapons will affect enemy 





Low Social Capital Among States 
  Social capital is a variable that has to do with the level of trust and commitment to shared 
objective among organizations, people or networks.33  When it comes to social capital among 
nations, historical records have highlighted that states should not totally trust other states 
regarding nuclear weapons.  In that regard, it is easy to criticize the use of nuclear weapons 
during World War II; nonetheless, given those circumstances, any dominant state involved in 
that war would probably have taken the same path to develop its own nuclear weapons and use 
them when necessary.  If nuclear weapons represent the maximum guarantee of power and 
success for a nation, who would not want that kind of power?  It is not surprising that despite 
being a key ally for the United States during World War II, the Soviet Union used a network of 
spies to steal nuclear weapon secrets from the Manhattan Project.34  
Moreover, even allies can disagree when it comes to nuclear weapons.  For instance, the 
United States and the United Kingdom initially cooperated to develop nuclear weapons.  
Nonetheless, the McMahon Act of 1946 banned any official cooperation between the United 
States and the United Kingdom.  As a result, the United Kingdom had to conduct its own first 
nuclear test in Monte Bello in 1952.35  Similarly, despite being a NATO member, France did not 
receive the expected help from the United States and the United Kingdom to develop nuclear 
weapons during the 1950s.36  After that, other states such as China, India, and Pakistan have 
similarly developed their nuclear platforms, in spite of international concern.   
Consequently, it is not a matter of just or unjust use of nuclear weapons.  It is a matter of 
guaranteeing the survival of a nation at any cost when facing another nuclear-armed state or 
trying to survive a future war.  For example, the U.S. military seriously considered targeting 
enemy forces with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and the Vietnam War.37  It is not 
surprising that when humanity realized the colossal power of Little Boy and Fat Man during 
World War II, many desired to have their own platform for nuclear weapons. 
As of today, there is an estimated nine states with nuclear weapons capabilities.38  While 
this may be true, it is probable that in decades to come more states will develop their own 
nuclear weapons through the employment of covert and overt mechanisms.  It worth noting that 
warfare theorists believe that states with nuclear power for civil purposes can use that platform 
and knowledge to gradually weaponize it.39  Although it is difficult to establish a scientific model 
to predict how and when a state will develop nuclear weapons capabilities, the pattern shows a 
tendency to increase in the long term. 
In fact, no state can totally trust another state.  For instance, in 1941, Germany conducted 
a surprise conventional attack against the Soviet Union despite both having a non-aggression 
pact.40  Likewise, in 1944, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor without properly declaring war against 
the United States.41  Later in 1962, the Soviet Union covertly placed nuclear warheads in Cuba to 
counter American nuclear weapons in Turkey.42  It could be argued that those deceitful acts were 
something from the past.  Rather, history has highlighted that states can eventually pay painful 
consequences, if they put their trust in the intentions of other states.  For instance, in the 1990s, 
Ukraine gave up thousands of nuclear weapons on behalf of enduring peace.43  The international 
community believed that there will be an eternal peace between Russia and Ukraine.  
Nonetheless, in 2004, Russia secretively annexed the Peninsula of Crimea, which surprised the 
international community due to the nature of that hybrid operation.  Nowadays, after the 
annexation of Crimea, many scholars still wonder if Russia would have dared to seize Crimea if 




Partial compliance of legal framework 
The 1968 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) has the commitment of 
five nuclear-weapon states to not transfer knowledge or technology related to nuclear weapons to 
non-nuclear-weapon states. They also agreed to nuclear disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear 
power.45  In spite of the creation of the this treaty, India in 1974 and Pakistan in 1998 
successfully tested nuclear weapons.46  Similarly, Israel allegedly conducted a nuclear test in 
1979, which is known as the Vela Incident.47  Later, North Korea used Article X of the NPT to 
abandon this treaty in 2003.48  Until now, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests.49  Lately, 
Iran is trying to do the same by covertly developing nuclear weapons, which made the United 
States abandon the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA) in 2018.50  As a result, the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty has not successfully restricted access to 
technology and knowledge related to nuclear weapons.  To make matters more complicated, no 
single nuclear-weapon state has totally complied with Article VI of the 1968 Non-Proliferation 
Treaty of Nuclear Weapons to abandon the current nuclear arms race and get rid of nuclear 
weapons.51  Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons highlights the 
commitment to disarmament as one of its three main components, it is understandable that no 
single nuclear-weapon state will guarantee its survival based on mere paperwork.   
Secondly, the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) stipulates the 
prohibition of nuclear testing.52  Nevertheless, nuclear-weapon states have not fully accepted this 
treaty.  For instance, while nuclear-weapon states like United Kingdom, France, and Russia have 
signed and ratified the treaty, the United States and China have not ratified it.  Likewise, Israel as 
a state with presumable nuclear weapon capabilities has imitated this posture by not ratifying this 
treaty.  Additionally, despite being a nuclear-armed states, Pakistan, India and North Korea have 
never signed or ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.53  Consequently, banning 
of future nuclear testing is still far from being accomplished.  
Thirdly, the 2017 Treaty of Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is a legally binding 
document, which entered into force on January 22, 2021 to prohibit nuclear weapons in the 
world.54  In other words, this treaty has the objective of making the world free of nuclear 
weapons.  As of 2021, 50 states have signed and ratified this treaty.  Nonetheless, the five 
nuclear-weapon states recognized by the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons and 
NATO members have rejected this treaty.55  It is obvious that states with or under a nuclear 
weapon umbrella will not surrender their power and jeopardize survival based on mere good 
intentions.  
This issue will be an important precedent for international systems as they relate to 
nuclear weapons.  If the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom, as 
members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons, claim that they do not have to 
comply with the 2017 Treaty of Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons because they have never signed 
it, it is probable that this conduct will validate the posture of Israel, Pakistan, and India that have 
never signed the 1968 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty.  Moreover, this behavior 
will also validate the posture of India, Pakistan, and North Korea related to the 1996 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty because they will not have to comply with it based on 
the fact that they have never signed this treaty, either.  Needless to say, North Korea will reaffirm 
its decision to abandon this treaty in 2003.   
Fourthly, the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty proposed the 
elimination of ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles able to carry nuclear weapons from 500 
 
to 5,500 kilometers.56  This treaty was signed between the United States and the Soviet Union.  
Nonetheless, the United States in 2019 withdrew from the INF because of reiterated violations 
by Russia.57  As of 2021, NATO and the United States have rejected Russian offers to stop the 
deployment of its 9M729 missile system, which can jeopardize NATO security.58  Despite some 
considerations, the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty did not consider air or sea-
based missile platforms, which opened the door to ever-increasing developments in missile 
delivery platforms for nuclear weapons.   
On the other hand, there is an increasing disagreement among nuclear-weapon states in 
terms of how long the 2011 New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) should be extended 
because this treaty can affect their security and their nuclear-weapon platforms.59  Although this 
treaty intends to reduce American and Russian strategic nuclear warheads until 2026, Russia and 
the United States have conflicting arguments about the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons and 
the unwillingness of China to participate in that treaty.   
 
Miscalculated state narratives 
In today’s world, nuclear weapons can protect what states believe is important based on 
their narratives.  Throughout history, nations have experienced different events that have shaped 
how they perceive the environment and how they react.  Considering how Russia has faced 
successive invasions from the Mongols in 1237, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1569, 
the Swedish Army in 1700, the Napoleonic Army in 1812, and the Nazi Germany in 1941, it is 
easy to understand why Russia needs to intervene when it perceives its security is in danger.60  A 
case in point is how Russia intervened in South Ossetia in 2008 and annexed the peninsula of 
Crimea in 2014 before Georgia and Ukraine could join NATO through the Membership Action 
Plan. NATO expansion is perceived by Russia as a form of encroachment.61 
Similarly, by the 1800s, the United States embraced the ideology known as Manifest 
Destiny, which contributed to its expansion in territories controlled by Mexico, Spain, and 
Britain.62  Later, Manifest Destiny set the stage for the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt 
Corollary, which rejected any intervention by European monarchies in the Americas and 
provided justification for the annexation of Hawaii based of national security considerations.63 
On the other hand, China’s narrative highlights the period known as the century of 
humiliation, when hegemonic powers like the British Empire, France, Czarist Russia, the 
Imperial Japanese, and different international coalitions dominated China.64  Consequently, 
China’s narrative will provide the logic to develop nuclear weapons to deter future invasions.  It 
is not surprising that China is covertly militarizing the South China Sea despite international 
concerns and accusations from many countries.65  In fact, China is actually developing a massive 
anti-access/area of denial in the South China Sea to deter what China perceives as external 
aggressions.66   
Like Russia’s narrative, China’s narrative justifies the development of nuclear deterrence 
to protect the state and its interests.  In the same way, Israel will not allow another Holocaust.  
Along these lines, it is alleged that Israel maintains a nuclear ambiguity, which does not confirm 
or deny the possession of nuclear weapons.67  Similarly, it is clear that the United States will 
never allow another Pearl Harbor or another September 11 attack.  This is why it is important to 
analyze the history and narratives of countries to understand why nuclear-armed states will 





Flawed nuclear deterrence theory 
It could be argued that nuclear deterrence theory can prevent wars against states with 
nuclear weapons capabilities.  However, nuclear weapons cannot deter states from fighting 
conventional or irregular wars.  For instance, during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the United 
States and the Soviet Union were on the brink of starting World War III.  Although this event did 
not end in war, the potential fight among nuclear-weapon states could have been fatal.  Similarly, 
in 1999, despite having nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan fought each other because of 
security concerns in the Kashmir Valley.68  As of today, military tensions are still present.  For 
instance, in 2020, Chinese and Indian military forces clashed in the Galwan Valley region, which 
highlights worrying security concerns due to the fact that China and India are states with a 
combined estimate of 430 nuclear warheads.69   
Although states with nuclear weapons like India and China have affirmed their 
compromise with a no-first-use policy.  This policy has the goal of preventing the use of nuclear 
weapons as a first choice.  Nonetheless, many states with nuclear weapons have refused to 
adhere to any policy that could affect their decision-making process to attack other states if 
necessary.  For instance, the United States maintains a flexible policy regarding the use of 
nuclear weapons for national security reasons.70  Nevertheless, no-first-use policy is mere 
paperwork, because no state will trust in other states’ decision-making process to use nuclear 
weapons.   
 
Conclusion 
In summary, nuclear disarmament is a utopia because there is no such a thing as enduring 
peace or total trust in another state.  Because of the anarchical international system, there is no 
central authority to control the decision-making process of states.  Moreover, international 
organizations cannot deter powerful states from attacking other nations because any state could 
find reasons to protect its integrity and guarantee its survival.  Many states have not totally 
complied with the current legal framework because they need to rely on cutting-edge technology 
to enhance nuclear weapons.  Similarly, low social capital and miscalculated state narratives 
increase mistrust among states.  As a result, nuclear disarmament is a utopia because powerful 
states would like to keep their own nuclear-weapon ring of Gyges.  If that legendary ring had the 
power to transform a mere shepherd into a mighty king, it is possible that a nuclear-weapon ring 
could take a state from being defenseless to being able to protect itself.  Therefore, why would a 
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